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ABSTRACT
This paper develops an analytical framework to assess the quality 
of deliberation in the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA). 
Despite rhetoric on ‘equal partnership’ between ACP and EU countries, 
academic assessments of the Cotonou Agreement point to the lasting 
asymmetrical power relationship, most visible in the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiations. However, this paper 
assesses to what extent the JPA debate on EPAs can approach the 
ideal type of deliberation. The empirical investigation is based on 
participatory observation, semi-structured interviews and an analysis 
of primary documents, including the attendance lists of 29 JPA 
sessions, more than 40 resolutions and 120 parliamentary questions 
related to the trade-development nexus.
Introduction
One of the main debates that is currently taking place in EU development circles deals with 
the future of the partnership between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Countries. After almost 60 years of cooperation, including several revisions, the central ques-
tion relates to what will happen after 2020, when the current Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
expires. On this occasion, several evaluations of the past cooperation have been published.1 
At the end of 2015, the Commission also held a public consultation on the partnership and 
the ACP-EU relations after 2020.
The debate raises key questions on the nature of the relationship and the ‘extent to which 
it remains valid for the future and offers a platform to advance joint interests’.2 A key point 
of interrogation in this regard is whether the Cotonou Agreement has been an expression 
of an equal partnership, as it proclaims to be, or whether it is just a continuation of an asym-
metrical partnership and a relic of the colonial past. Most academic literature on ACP-EU 
relations makes a rather different evaluation than the normative discourse of the EU itself, 
pointing to lasting power imbalances.3 However, so far this literature has not paid attention 
to the expression of this relationship within the joint institutions that underpin the ACP-EU 
partnership, and certainly not to the specific institutional setting of the ACP-EU JPA. This is 
remarkable for several reasons. First, the JPA is the oldest and most institutionalised 
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parliamentary assembly between the countries of the global North and South. Second, the 
parliamentary dimension has grown in importance both within and beyond the EU-ACP 
framework. Third, and most important in the context of this paper, arguably the ACP-EU JPA 
is the place in which real dialogue between the different parties is most likely to be 
approached, especially when compared to intergovernmental negotiations.
The results of the Commission’s public consultation on the ACP-EU partnership after 2020 
does not provide clear insights on the ACP-EU JPA as it appears that stakeholders are divided 
on the questions relating to the institutional set-up of the partnership. Although one part 
of the contributors see the joint institutions as relevant ‘as they provide for genuine dialogue, 
strengthen the ACP-EU positions in the global arena and make ACP countries’ political voice 
stronger’,4 others consider other regional and sub-regional organisations as far more relevant 
than ACP-EU cooperation. Apart from this division over the general institutional set-up, it is 
not clear how the specific role of the ACP-EU JPA is perceived. Hence, by focusing on the 
ACP-EU JPA, this paper aims to provide new insights and add to the existing policy-oriented 
and academic evaluations of ACP-EU relations.
When analysing the ACP-EU JPA the paper takes a deliberative approach to parliamentary 
debate. It draws on the definition of deliberation by Steenbergen et al.,5 as a ‘process in 
which political actors listen to each other, reasonably justify their positions, show mutual 
respect and are willing to re-evaluate and eventually revise their initial preferences through 
a process of discourse about competing validity claims’. The choice for this theoretical per-
spective to study the partnership follows from two main arguments. One argument is pro-
cedural, as the procedures of deliberation may allow for an equal debate in an asymmetrical 
relationship. The second argument is substantial as deliberation is considered to be a pre-
condition for a critical and rational substantial debate between divergent views, interests 
and identities. This paper thus aims to assess the quality of deliberation in the ACP-EU JPA 
in order to evaluate the extent to which the JPA approaches the ideal type of an equal 
partnership.
Empirically, the paper focuses on the JPA debate on the trade-development nexus, and 
more specifically on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), one of the most exemplary 
issues for demonstrating the unequal partnership between the EU and the ACP countries. 
Hence the research question that this paper aims to answer can be narrowed down to the 
following: to what extent does the JPA dialogue on EPAs approach the ideal type of deliberation? 
In doing so, the paper also aims to offer new empirical insights into the substantive position 
of the JPA in recent years on the trade-development nexus, and more specifically on the 
EPAs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the 
background on the role of the ACP-EU JPA and a brief review of the academic literature on 
ACP-EU relations. Subsequently, section three discusses the theoretical perspective of 
deliberation and develops an analytical framework to study deliberation in the ACP-EU JPA. 
Section four outlines the methodology used for the data generation and analysis. The analysis 
is based on participatory observation, 37 semi-structured interviews and an analysis of 
primary documents, including the attendance lists of 29 sessions, more than 40 resolutions, 
120 publically available parliamentary questions to the Commission and the Council and 
responses by the Commission (hereafter referred to simply as parliamentary questions) 
related to the trade-development nexus over the past 15 years. Section five discusses the 
results of the analysis of deliberation in the ACP-EU JPA based on the five main criteria for 
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ideal deliberation. Finally, the paper concludes with some general reflections on the main 
findings of this study, linking them to some broader questions relating to ACP-EU relations.
The JPA and ACP-EU relations
In the past decade one of the central debates on the EU’s policies towards developing coun-
tries has focused on the character of the relationship between the EU and the ACP regions, 
and notably, the EU institutions’ discourse centred on ‘equal partnership’. This has been the 
case already since the 1970s with the entry into force of the Lomé Convention and it still 
dominates the EU discourse relating to the current Cotonou agreement. Indeed, Cotonou 
was designed to be a partnership between equals, to promote common interests and sus-
tainable development, relying on an open dialogue amongst the parties.6 However, this 
discourse on equal partnership has been strongly and widely criticised as mere rhetoric, 
which overshadows the asymmetrical power relationship that continues to characterise the 
ACP-EU framework. One of the central targets of this criticism is the EPAs. On the one hand, 
the EPA negotiations and specifically the inflexible approach of the Commission has been 
heavily criticised. Despite the EU’s rhetoric on the promotion of norms such as development, 
ownership and equal partnership, its attitude is marked by a neo-imperialist,7 or a hegemonic 
approach.8 On the other hand, much criticism has been directed towards the substance of 
the EPAs as they are designed to promote the EU model of economic liberalism and lock in 
neoliberalism across the ACP regions, while restricting the policy space of the ACP 
governments.9
The existing literature mainly focuses on the intergovernmental dimension of the rela-
tionship and on main actors such as the European Commission, the EU Member States, the 
Council and to a lesser extent on the ACP countries themselves. Much less attention has 
been paid to other actors of the partnership, despite their growing importance and increased 
presence in the partnership and its revisions over time. Some attention has been paid to the 
role of Non State Actors (NSAs) and specifically to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs),10 but 
hardly any attention has been paid to the parliamentarian dimension. Notable exceptions 
are an historical and institutional analysis of the ACP-EU JPA,11 a policy orientated study of 
the European Centre for Development Policy Management12 and an analysis of the ACP-EU 
JPA based on members’ perceptions.13 In the research on EPAs, which constitutes the empir-
ical focus of this study, the JPA has not been considered either, except for an article on the 
perception of Eastern African policy-makers of the possible consequences of EPAs on regional 
integration,14 and a book chapter on the promotion of core labour standards through the 
Cotonou and EPA process.15 Finally, in the relatively new field of parliamentary diplomacy 
and interparliamentary cooperation, the ACP-EU JPA has largely been overseen also, apart 
from one chapter in an edited volume on inter-parliamentary institutions.16
This lack of attention to the parliamentary dimension of ACP-EU relations is remarkable 
for several reasons. First, the JPA is the oldest and most institutionalised parliamentary assem-
bly between the countries of the global North and South. It was created to bring together 
an equal number of EU and the ACP parliamentarians for bi-annual meetings, rotating 
between the regions and to discuss issues of the three committees on political affairs; eco-
nomic development, finance and trade and social affairs and environment, respectively. 
Indeed, it has served as a model for similar North-South parliamentary assemblies, such as 
the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary 
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Assembly. Second, the parliamentary dimension has grown in importance both within and 
beyond the EU-ACP framework. It has gained importance under the successive revisions of 
the Cotonou Agreement. For example, in the amendments of the political pillar after the 
2005 review of Cotonou, the JPA was mentioned in Article 8 concerning the ‘essential ele-
ments’, implying the JPA should in the future be involved in the political dialogue. After the 
2010 review, the role of ACP national parliaments as well as the oversight role of JPA was 
strengthened,17 in line with the increasing focus on political dialogue over the successive 
conventions. Third, and most important in the context of this paper, arguably the ACP-EU 
JPA is the place in which real dialogue between the different parties is most likely to be 
approached. Shielded from power politics and lacking authority in terms of decision-making 
capacity, leaving more room for ideas and norms to be exchanged, deliberation is more likely 
to take place in this forum than in any intergovernmental negotiations.
Deliberation
The concept of deliberation has become increasingly central in political science debates 
since Habermas’ discourse ethics.18 Indeed, this has sparked much debate in the literature 
on discourse theory of deliberative democracy.19 Today, it continues to be one of the most 
relevant concepts to assess the processes used to reach reasoned consensus by shedding 
light on blind spots in political analyses. Indeed, in contrast to rationalist approaches, a 
deliberative perspective recognises that parliamentary debates are more than ‘cheap talk’.20 
Under specific conditions, deliberation can generate better-reasoned and informed positions 
that are, therefore, more legitimate and effective. Importantly, this paper employs the ideal 
type of deliberation as a heuristic tool and starts from the assumption that a real political 
debate will never fully reach the ideal type of deliberation. More specifically, this paper 
adopts a deliberative perspective on parliamentary debate for two reasons.
The first argument is procedural and emanates from the idea that deliberation is important 
to allow for an equal debate in an asymmetrical relationship. More specifically, according to 
Stie, ‘procedures of deliberation can ensure that not only the strong and powerful but also 
weaker and less resourceful groups can influence outcomes’.21 The second argument is sub-
stantial as deliberation is considered a prerequisite for a critical and rational debate between 
divergent views, interests or identities.22 The differences in world views, interests and iden-
tities amongst ACP and EU countries are often large and in such a context deliberation is all 
the more necessary to be a able to agree on a common and valid normative framework as 
it enables actors to change their own world views, interests, identities.23 Based on the existing 
literature on deliberation, an analytical framework has been developed (see Table 1) based 
on five main criteria identified for ideal deliberation i.e. the criteria that is necessary in order 
to arrive at valid norms,24 or legitimate outcomes.25 The analytical table allows us to study 
the quality of deliberation in the JPA and to assess to what extent does the JPA dialogue on 
EPAs approach the ideal type of deliberation?
The first criterion, participation, concerns the inclusion of all relevant affected parties. This 
criterion includes both a procedural and a substantial dimension. Procedurally, ideal delib-
eration requires the continuous participation of elected representatives. Substantially, opin-
ions of the actors should be representative and include the needs, interests, preferences and 
positions of all concerned parties. According to Stie, these factors come closest to assessing 
participation – as democratic deliberation or elite deliberation – in modern democracies 
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based on representative systems.26 Second, ideal deliberation should be characterised by 
openness in order to allow for a free and transparent public debate and scrutiny. Existing 
literature already highlights that deliberative meeting places are identified by their openness 
and transparency.27 Therefore, procedurally, the openness should be institutionalised through 
open sessions and the accessibility of the policy documents, background information, ver-
batim records and not merely minutes and voting results. Substantially, the public should 
be able to get a clear presentation of all the main dilemmas, visions and alternatives that 
circulate during deliberation. The third criterion is the ‘common good’ and refers to whether 
there is a display of ‘empathy, other-directedness, or solidarity that allows participants to 
consider the wellbeing of others and the community at large’,28 or purely narrow constitu-
encies’ interests in deliberation. In line with Rawls,29 we understand the common good in 
terms of references to the least advantaged in society, as opposed to Mill’s utilitarian defi-
nition based on the good of the greatest number of people.30 Fourth, deliberation should 
involve constructive politics. Risse explains, ‘the goal of discursive interaction is to achieve 
argumentative consensus with the other, not to push through one’s own view of the world 
or moral values’.31 As such, constructive politics is linked to the ability to reach reasoned or 
argumentative consensus through empathising and sharing a common lifeworld,32 as 
opposed to sticking to uncompromising positional politics. The fifth and final criterion refers 
to the presence of power neutralising mechanisms, or put simply, the rules of procedure. Risse 
highlights that the more that rules prescribe non-hierarchical behaviour between actors, 
the more the rules should enable argumentation within the given framework.33 This is an 
important criterion to assess whether not only the stronger more vociferous actors, but also 
the weaker and perhaps less powerful, can effectively contribute to argumentation to bal-
ance the tables in a partnership, which seeks to be equal.
In the table below these five main criteria are operationalised by means of sub-questions 
and corresponding empirical indicators. As explained in the introduction, the empirical focus 
is put on the JPA debate on the EPA negotiations. Additionally, it is indicated which data are 
used for each criterion. The next section outlines the methodology relating to the data 
generation and analysis in greater detail.
Methodology
The research presented in this paper is based on (1) document analysis, (2) semi-structured 
interviews and (3) participatory observation.
First, the document analysis is based on the attendance lists of 29 JPA sessions, more than 
40 resolutions and 120 publically available parliamentary questions related to the trade-
development nexus over the past 15 years. The choice for resolutions is motivated by the 
fact that these constitute the main outcome documents of the JPA and can thus be considered 
as the result of the deliberation. In contrast, parliamentary questions provide unique and 
exact insights into the concerns and preferences of the parliamentarians and offer a better 
understanding of the deliberation processes and the role and function of the JPA.34 Especially 
for the criterion of the ‘common good’, the analysis of parliamentary questions was useful 
to reveal whether the deliberation refers to narrow constituencies’ interests (or ‘local 
interests’) or to the common good (or ‘broader policy concerns for the least advantaged in 
society’). For example, references to ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘poor’, ‘women’, ‘ACP producers’ were 
coded to decipher the level of commitment to the common good. The analysis happened 
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through a systematic interpretation of these data, making use of codes. In doing so, we have 
employed an axial coding strategy35 in order to relate the content of the resolutions and 
questions to the different criteria of the analytical framework.
For the ‘participation’ criterion we have also conducted an analysis of the attendance lists 
from the first JPA session in 2000 in Brussels until the 30th session in 2015 in Brussels. No 
data were available for the 7th session of 2004 and the 5th session in Brussels in 2002 was 
cancelled, so we have analysed the attendance lists of 29 sessions in between 2000 and 
2015. A systematic comparison of these attendance lists enabled the calculation of the par-
ticipation rates of ACP and EU members as well as their delegation continuity.
Second, the analysis is also based on semi-structured interviews conducted in 2010 and 
2016 with 37 key ACP-EU JPA stakeholders, including JPA members and experts. The 2010 
round of interviews included EP administration (3), civil society (2) and think tank (1) repre-
sentatives as well as members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (8) and national ACP par-
liaments (10). The 2016 round of interviews included MEPs (2), EU officials (4) from the EEAS, 
DG DevCo, DG Trade and the EESC, EU NGOs (2), ACP Ambassadors (1) and ACP think tank 
representatives (1), as well as the JPA Secretariat on both the EU and ACP sides (3).36
Third and final, the insights also build on the authors’ participatory observation during 
the 15th session of the JPA in Ljubljana in March 2008, the 19th session in Spain in March-
April 2010 and the 30th session in Brussels in December 2015, as well as the standing 
Committees on Economic Development, Finance and Trade in Brussels, in October 2014, 
March 2015 and September 2015.
Analysis
This section will discuss the results of the analysis of deliberation in the ACP-EU JPA based 
on the five main criteria for ideal deliberation.
Participation
On participation, research on procedural indicators – continuity of participation and rep-
resentation of political groups – reveals that participation is problematic due to striking dif-
ferences on the EU and ACP sides. On the EU side, there is more or less stable participation 
during each legislature, although there are turnovers when elections are held every five 
years. While this was not deemed to be an issue per se, there was unanimous agreement 
amongst all interviewees on the disparity in participation when the JPA is held outside of 
Brussels. Some interviewees highlighted that MEPs are more active outside of the EU,37 and 
that there is higher attendance in exotic places.38 This acknowledgement has previously led 
to criticism of the JPA as a forum for ‘political tourism’.39 An analysis of the attendance lists40 
partly confirms this perceived imbalance. While the JPA sessions have gathered an average 
of 64% of the EU members of the JPA per session, some meetings have indeed attracted 
more MEPs than others. On the one hand, there is no significant difference in the average 
participation when the sessions take place in Brussels or Strasbourg (62%), in Europe (65%) 
or in an ACP country (63%). On the other hand however, we found evidence that attendance 
is indeed higher when JPA sessions take place at tourist destinations. The sessions with the 
highest MEP attendance rates41 were the gatherings in Cape Town (2002, 89%), Barbados 
(2006, 84%), Rome (2003, 84%) and Tenerife (2010, 80%). In contrast, the lowest participation 
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recorded was for the meetings in Strasbourg (March 2014, 27%, and December 2014, 42%), 
Brazzaville (2003, 38%) and Lomé (2011, 42%), where less than half of the EP members met 
their ACP counterparts.
On the ACP side, permanent participation is problematic as there are no permanent 
individual members, only permanent country members. Indeed, the list of the JPA members 
consists of the names of individual EP representatives and of the names of ACP countries. In 
formal terms, the ACP countries can delegate different MPs for each JPA session. Consequently 
their formal average attendance is rather high and higher than the MEPs attendance, namely 
70% per session. Unlike the MEPs, attendance seems to be rather stable over the different 
sessions, and we found no peaks when the JPA took place at tourist destinations. However, 
when the sessions take place in Brussels or Strasbourg on the one hand, or another European 
city on the other, ACP attendance is slightly higher on average (73 and 72%, respectively) 
than JPA gatherings in ACP countries (67%). The largest part of ACP countries are also loyal 
participators: over the past 15 years, 77% of the ACP members have attended more than 
half of all the JPA sessions, while 61% have even attended more than 75% of the sessions. 
ACP countries are not obliged to appoint permanent MPs to the JPA and although the degree 
of individual permanence within their delegations is lower than on the European side, most 
of the loyal participating countries maintain a rather high degree of continuity within their 
delegations, sending the same MP to the JPA for several years, contributing to an enabling 
context for deliberation.
Where the EU side may lack on continuity, it makes up for it in representation due to the 
cluster of active and loyal MEPs who represent a nearly perfect reflection of the political 
groups in the EP. On the ACP side, most participants represent their respective governments 
by being delegates of the majority parties, but there are a few exceptions – whereby the 
opposition is also represented42 – which are good signs for democracy, according to some 
interviewees. One interviewee expressed frustration with the ACP side because ‘there is 
always an issue of government officials attending in parliamentarians’ positions (…) [and] 
this loses focus on the objective’.43 These issues impact deliberation precisely because of the 
nature of the Assembly to engage parliamentarians. However, Art.1 (2) JPA rules of procedure 
sets out the provisions whereby if a state may not be able to send parliamentarians due to 
‘forces majeures’ – if parliament is suspended or doesn’t exist – a representative may be 
nominated via letter by the speaker of the given parliament. This touches on the crux of the 
issue in representative systems of whether parliamentarians engage in democratic or elite 
deliberations. In this case, there is a fine line of demarcation, and perhaps often an interplay 
of both since parliamentary representatives, or government officials as nominated repre-
sentatives, are part of an elite.44
Despite issues of procedural participation, on the substantial indicators, it seems rather 
straightforward to grasp the variety of different actors’ opinions on both the possible positive 
and negative implications of the EPAs, as well as the more critical positions in the debate 
from the sum of the empirical research. However, there is variation on what can be grasped 
from resolutions to the parliamentary questions individually. More specifically, the parlia-
mentary questions reflect the variety of opinions more explicitly than the resolutions. For 
example, while, the resolutions include many references to the different risks of EPAs, they 
have the tendency to refer to these in a more cautious manner. In general, the resolutions 
tend to address the potential risks of the EPAs, as opposed to taking a position on the topic. 
For example, one resolution states that ‘many ACP countries fear that the current trend in 
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the EPA negotiations and the adoption of agreements by subregions may undermine 
regional integration efforts’.45 In the same vein, the resolution on ‘EPA: problems and per-
spectives’ also states the fact but does not take a position: ‘negotiations conducted so far 
have revealed serious divergences between the ACP and the EU’.46 Although the JPA refers 
to several marginalised groups – including NSA (10% of the resolutions), women’s organi-
sations (21%), civil society groups (19%) producer and consumer organisations (24 and 12%, 
respectively) – the JPA does not actively strive for their active participation in the majority 
of texts analysed.47 Yet, EPA-specific resolutions had a much stronger correlation with being 
more participative by having significantly more references to these groups than the other 
resolutions on the trade-development nexus in general.
In contrast, parliamentary questions overtly indicate opinions on the EPAs, even ques-
tioning the fundamentals of the EU’s neoliberal agenda. For example, one MEP asked, ‘In 
view of the protests that have taken place (…) in Africa against the EPAs, is the Commission 
not willing to listen to the people (…) Free trade agreements have been a failure (…) so is 
the Commission going to shift its policy stance?’48 Indeed, the more critical perspectives – on 
shortcomings, contradictions or counter-movements – are more easily grasped from parlia-
mentary questions than resolutions, and they have often been additionally substantiated 
through participatory observation and interviews.
Openness
On openness, four issues were identified, which underscore that the JPA’s relatively good 
openness (publically available documents, a dedicated website, etc.) is severely impacted 
by certain procedural impediments (navigating the JPA maze), which tangibly impact the 
accessibility of the Assembly. First, on minutes and voting results, there are no detailed 
minutes and the explanation of the voting results is on the European Parliament website for 
MEP’s votes (when available), as opposed to the JPA website. Second, stakeholders have 
noted that committees may be easily accessible and on the agenda of the JPA, however 
information and policy documents on ‘workshops’ (Art. 27 JPA rules of procedure) are not.49 
Third, JPA plenary and committee sessions are open to the general public, although accred-
itation is needed and this in itself can be problematic in practice. One CSO stakeholder noted 
that ‘access to documents is good but access to the forum is not easy. We’ve always had to 
fight for it and logistically it was always a challenge but friends within the JPA helped us’.50 
Fourth, while policy documents and background information are publicly available on the 
JPA website, there is limited accessibility due to the current layout of the website, the lack 
of clear categorisation of documents and their accessibility in advance of the sessions.51 
However, the JPA Secretariat has informed us that they do plan to revamp the website to 
make it more user-friendly. An additional element of accessibility is the possibility to web 
stream the plenary sessions live in the European Parliament, however this has proven to be 
too costly in ACP countries. The JPA Secretariat also mentioned plans to web stream com-
mittee meetings, although some stakeholders expressed preference that these remain off 
camera to allow for enhanced substantial openness.
Surprisingly, the aforementioned procedural issues did not significantly impact substantial 
openness as the documents reviewed displayed a full range of dilemmas, visions and alter-
natives, with the exception of the issue of ACP bloc voting. The ACP side of the JPA consist-
ently vote as a bloc, which obscures the possibility to grasp the different substantial issues 
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amongst the ACP parliamentarians themselves. However, in the resolutions and parliamen-
tary questions, it is relatively straightforward to grasp the substantial issues on openness. 
For example, typical dilemmas referenced include the capacity constraints in ACP countries, 
regulatory barriers to trade and the impact of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy reform.52 
Similarly, the resolutions include both global EU-ACP visions in the ACP context, which refer 
to achieving the objectives of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (with reference to the 
relevant articles), and more JPA parliamentary-specific visions. For example, one innovative 
vision was the suggestion that national and regional parliaments set up functional stake-
holder mechanisms.53 Additionally, several JPA resolutions have made outright reference to 
alternatives with reference to Art. 37(6) Cotonou, which states that ‘the Community (…) will 
examine all possible alternative possibilities’ vis-à-vis the EPAs. Indeed, the overall perception 
from interviews is that openness is good.
Common good
On common good, the Assembly displayed continued concern on the social impacts of 
Cotonou. There are consistent and widespread references to vulnerable or marginalised 
groups across all data reviewed. For example in the parliamentary questions, some of the 
issues raised include: (i) the protection of the weakest economies in the SADC EPA and (ii) 
references to impact studies that predict a narrowing of social and economic policy spaces 
for ACP countries.54 Interestingly, narrow interests appear more from interviews with JPA 
stakeholders than in official documents. For example, one interviewee explained, ‘There is 
a near unanimous view on the EPA in the JPA and this is very surprising. The JPA has been 
consistent in emphasising the development dimension of EPA (…) [and] The JPA has tended 
to focus on social impact of Cotonou’.55 The particular case referenced by this interviewee 
was the JPA deliberations on the EU Market Access Regulation (i.e. that countries would no 
longer benefit from preferential access to the EU market if they did not ratify the EPA by 1 
October 2014), which was considered to be decisive in making the Commission extend the 
deadline for one year.56 This is striking as it shows that the EP as an institution via the JPA, 
can agree on common good issues with its ACP parliamentarian counterparts, in stark con-
trast to the Commission and its ACP governmental counterparts. This can be explained by 
the nature of the JPA setting where, in contrast to intergovernmental negotiations, stakes 
are lower, allowing participants to behave less strategically and update their opinions based 
on arguments and new information. Moreover, in contrast to national parliaments, the JPA 
debates are less oriented towards voting or mobilising constituencies, but more towards 
aggregating new information and arguments and weighing positions.57 Hence, majority 
votes to pass resolutions, including block voting on the ACP side, means that the Assembly 
is more prone to achieving consensus and divergence is less evident, and certainly not 
publicly available information.58
Participatory observation in JPA debates shows that there is a much more evident inter-
play of common good, expressed as empathy, solidarity and consideration of the other’s 
well-being, than narrow interests. This was confirmed by interviewees, who conceded that 
this criterion ranges between good and satisfactory at the JPA. Also, the parliamentary ques-
tions paid a lot of attention to the least advantaged and the well-being of the ACP regions 
at large. For example, at several points in time, concerns have been raised about the condi-
tions on which poor countries are eligible for debt relief.59
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However, the analysis of the resolutions indicates more textual emphasis on ‘products’ 
and ‘production’, as opposed to vulnerable ACP producers. This undermines the claim that 
the JPA focuses on the social aspects of Cotonou. Indeed, remarkably, groups such as LDCs 
(in 48% of the resolutions), vulnerable states (36%), the poor (29%), indigenous persons (7%) 
and ACP farmers (17%) are not consistently referred to throughout the resolutions. Moreover, 
where references were made to the common good, there was evidence that this could be 
linked to local interests. For example, one interviewee pointed out to a perversion of the 
common good by linking narrow fisheries interests with the wider debate on sustainable 
development.60 This raises the question, the common good from whose perspective? Can 
the solidarity at the JPA bridge EU and ACP interests or is it a euro-centric, or even euro-selfish 
construction of common issues?61
Constructive politics
On constructive politics, it is evident that the JPA is able to reach a consensus on EPAs. There 
is also clearly consensus both within the resolution texts and also across the texts over the 
years, especially on the ‘development dimension’ of EPAs and possible risks for sustainable 
development. Yet, despite an overwhelming consensus on the EPAs at the JPA, there were 
deeper more problematic concerns that consensus happened at the expense of content, 
and ‘ACP self-censorship’.62 This raises non-negligible issues relating to the qualitative ele-
ments of reaching argumentative consensus. Firstly, the quality of debates has been deemed 
to be weak based, in part, on the fact that only like-minded EU and ACP political parties 
meet each other and there is less of a constructive interaction with the entirety of political 
representatives. Indeed, side-meetings of informal groups of friends amongst EU and ACP 
parliamentarians – the ‘Windhoek Dialogue’ for the Conservatives, the ‘International Socialists’ 
and the ‘ALDE-PAK’ for the Liberals – mean that divergences are limited and based on ideol-
ogy as opposed to EU vs. ACP lines. For example, EU and ACP parliamentarians may agree 
on hunting as a benefit (or not) for sustainable development within their informal groups 
of friends, but this cannot be gaged from the ACP block voting or the resolutions based on 
consensus. This is an example of deliberation within the remit of the JPA, but outside the 
formal context of debate, which is only evident from interviews and participatory observa-
tion. One MEP put it crudely that ‘participants are generally optimistic and dreamers, there-
fore dreaming about a common lifeworld’.63 Secondly, one interviewee recalled witnessing 
self-censorship on the side of ACP parliamentarians,64 wherein they could not push their 
views too far because the EU side can call for a split vote i.e. the EU and the ACP sides can 
vote separately, as opposed to voting together as one house, and both must have a majority 
on both sides of the house in order for a resolution to pass. For this reason, it is no surprise 
that country oriented resolutions are harder to get consensus on, and that although LDCs 
are usually very nationalistic and less focused on the EU-ACP dimension, consensus is still 
reached. Linked to this latter critique, one interviewee described the JPA as ‘a structure for 
giving pretense of democratic legitimacy and ACP endorsement of the EU position’.65 From 
this perspective therefore, arriving at a rationally motivated consensus at the JPA is never-
theless based on EU preferences, world view and moral values. However, there is a finer line 
of demarcation due to the limited display of ‘personal politics’, wherein the majority of speak-
ers make ‘mediating proposals’ that are appropriate for the JPA agenda.66 This implies that 
in general,67 members come to the Assembly with the common lifeworld spirit, less inclined 
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to sit on their positions and less inclined to pursue openly argumentative deliberation since 
consensus is the given outcome.
Power neutralising mechanisms
On power neutralising mechanisms, it was interesting to note that institutional actors con-
sidered this criterion to be very good, in contrast to non-institutional EU and ACP experts 
who were more critical and expressly linked the rules of procedure to determining the out-
comes and impact of the JPA deliberation. The JPA rules of procedure include 35 articles – 
stipulating the Public nature of proceedings, the Adoption of the Agenda, Seating 
arrangements, Official languages, Right to speak, Right to vote and methods of voting, 
Assembly resolutions and Amendments, Questions for written answer, Consultation with 
civil society, financial regulation amongst others – and 4 Annexes, which have been revised 
eight times since adoption on 3 April 2003. Overall, it can be considered to be clear and 
transparent. Indeed, interviewees largely considered the rules of procedure to be between 
satisfactory on the low end to very good on the high end. Even a more critical viewpoint 
explains, ‘It is difficult with the EU and the ACP because there is mistrust and agenda setting. 
(…) Yet, there is nothing that obstructs expressing opinion’.68 Even more critical JPA MEPs 
recognised, ‘There is no hierarchy and no asymmetry’,69 and ‘therefore no problem’.70
A closer look at the JPA rules of procedure de jure shows that the power neutralising 
mechanisms, nevertheless preserves asymmetries between the Parties. For example, Art. 10 
JPA rules of procedure on seating arrangements was identified by one interviewee as per-
petuating asymmetries between EU and ACP parliamentarians, whereby the former is 
referred to by their name and the latter by their country.71 Similarly, Art. 19 on amendments 
also states that ‘An ACP representative with the right to vote, a political group or ten members 
may table amendments’ also underlines this difference between ACP on the one hand and 
MEPs who represent their political groups. In addition, Art. 20 and 21 on ‘Questions for written 
answer’ and ‘Question time’, respectively, there is a burden on the European Commission 
(and the ACP-EU Council of Ministers) to respond, but no equivalent burden on the ACP side 
to respond to issues raised at the JPA. However, in practice, the ACP Secretariat is not an 
equal vis-à-vis the Commission, and indeed there is no equivalent follow-up on the ACP side. 
This additional obligation to follow-up on the EU side, and lack of it on the ACP side in prac-
tice, gives concessions to the ACP and underscores the inequality of partnership as opposed 
to equality.
A closer look at rules of procedure de facto, that is mastery of these rules, shows that in 
practice it is a double-edged sword. For example, in committees, all members are equal 
vis-à-vis speaking time, but in the plenary session the d’Hondt method is applied therefore 
larger groups on the EP side have more speaking time. However, the ACP side is larger overall 
and has the decisive vote. As such, the power at the JPA is equivalent to the ACP voting as 
a bloc – which is consistently the case – regardless of the difference in speaking time. Indeed, 
stakeholders on both the EU and ACP side have recognised the JPA rules of procedure as a 
benefit to the ACP, and as an extension, some believe this guarantees a ‘debate between 
equals’.72 From this perspective, the rules of procedure means that the ACP side does not 
merely rubber-stamp the resolution on the table because working methods mean that both 
sides must work towards compromise. The only way around this, whereby a resolution does 
not pass, is when a majority vote occurs through a vote by separate EU and ACP houses, the 
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so-called split vote. One interviewee perfectly summed up, ‘rules of procedure are important 
in political process and they can advantage or disadvantage parties but it is the mastery of 
these rules that matter’.73
Conclusions
By studying the EU-ACP JPA, this paper aimed to provide new insights and add to the existing 
policy-oriented and academic evaluations of ACP-EU relations. Fleshing out the deliberative 
framework allowed us to respond to the key question: to what extent does the JPA 
dialogue on EPAs approach the ideal type of deliberation? By focusing on five key criteria for 
deliberation – participation, openness, common good, constructive politics and power 
neutralising mechanism – this analysis shed light on the fact that real dialogue between 
different parties is not always guaranteed. Or, the JPA dialogue on EPAs struggles to approach 
the ideal type of deliberation, even if there is overwhelming consensus on EPAs at the JPA.
This is largely due to a number of recurrent critical issues across the different criteria. On 
the criteria of participation, there is procedural continuity which creates an enabling envi-
ronment for deliberation, however there remains a fundamental distinction between rep-
resenting their political parties and ACP parliamentarians representating their country. 
Substantially, the parliamentary questions are more inclusive of the variety of all actors’ 
opinions, compared to the resolutions. On openness, given the high-level nature of the 
Assembly, the procedural openness of the JPA means that it is relatively accessible, despite 
the fact that the results of the votes are not publicly available digitally. Additionally, ACP 
bloc voting limits the substantial openness to the individual parliamentary positions during 
the debate. In relation to the common good, there is a tension between the interviewees’ 
perceived solidarity in the JPA and the parliamentary questions about broader policy con-
cerns for the least advantaged on the one hand, and the actual prevalence of narrow interests 
linked to the trade-development nexus evidence from the resolutions on the other hand. 
Regarding constructive politics, despite an overwhelming consensus on the EPAs at the JPA, 
there were deeper more problematic concerns that consensus happened at the expense of 
content, and ‘ACP self-censorship. Finally, despite several amendments to the rules of proce-
dure over the years, the asymmetry between the EU and ACP parliamentarians has never 
been overcome.
This was the first attempt at a more holistic and systematic analysis of deliberation at the 
JPA, which led us to develop the ‘Quality of deliberation analytical framework’. Applying the 
criteria in the framework to the extensive empirical data of the JPA enabled us to come to 
a deep and thorough understanding of the nature of the debate. However, we have also 
identified a number of areas that merit further research, which are largely linked to further 
investigating divergence at the JPA. For example, procedurally, the use of ACP bloc voting 
or ‘self-censorship’, the presence of representatives of ACP opposition parties and the JPA 
split vote can fundamentally impact the outcome on deliberation.
Additionally, substantially, deliberations on non-resolutions, failed resolutions and debates 
without resolutions are another layer of untapped empirical data, which could provide an 
even deeper understanding of the complex nature of deliberation at the JPA. Currently, our 
analysis demonstrates the ccomplementarity of the variety of parliamentary instruments/
arenas for deliberation, including questions, resolutions, plenary debates and workshops to 
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name a few. However, a key pitfall remains follow-up debates at the national parliamentary 
level.
Finally, these new findings have raised some deeper and unanswered issues on the power, 
impact and relevance of the JPA, which ought to be develop in further research, especially 
leading up to the expiry of Cotonou in 2020. Deliberation in the JPA has shown that ideas 
do not always travel in reciprocal directions, which brings into question the fundamentals 
of equal partnership between unequal regions. In other words, this questions the founda-
tions of the Cotonou Agreement, namely the ability to ‘discuss issues’ and ‘facilitate greater 
understanding between the peoples of the European Union and those of the ACP’ (Art. 17 
Cotonou).
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